







   
   
   
   
 
   








Humans and Animals at the Divide: The Case of Feral Children
H. Peter Steeves
DePaul University
1. Introduction: Encountering the Other
In September 1920, Reverend J. A. L. Singh set out into the Indian night to kill 
the Manush-Bagha, the man-ghost of the jungle.[1] The creature, it was said, 
had the body and limbs of a human, the face of a ghost. The villagers warned the 
Reverend that it was a hideous beast—possibly not of this world—and that no 
one was safe in the jungle. Part human, part animal, part who-knows-what, but 
Supernatural—to be sure—they assured him that it was a reason to travel in 
groups, to be sure to be home before dusk turned into night and the beast 
awakened, hungry. 
Reverend Singh, more curious than frightened, suggested constructing a 
platform in a tree in order to have a vantage point from which to shoot the beast, 
but the villagers wanted no part of it. By early October, though, he had finally 
found someone to lead him to a place where there had been several sightings— 
to a white-ant mound near Godamuri, where the locals told stories of a creature 
that raced through the night, haunting the jungle. Singh and his party set up 
camp near the ant mound and began their vigil.  
The short wait was soon rewarded. The first evening, three wolves tentatively 
made their way out of the ground, squeezing through the large holes in the 
mound. They were followed by two wolf cubs and, finally, two white creatures— 
the man-ghosts—which Reverend Singh immediately recognized to be two 
female human children.  
Singh persuaded the group to hold their fire as the wolf family disappeared into
the jungle. Visibly shaken, the party disbanded and headed back to the village in 
spite of the Reverend’s assurance that he had solved the mystery, in spite of his 
pleas to remain and help excavate the mound. After the close encounter with the 
creatures no one, in fact, would stay with Reverend Singh, and he was forced to 
search for a new party of men from a tribe far away and unacquainted with the 
ghost story. One week later, he returned with his new group and began the dig, 
hoping to capture what he now believed to be the two feral children—human girls 
raised and cared for by the wolf-family in the middle of the Indian wilderness.  
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With the first few strokes of the shovel, two male wolves emerged from the 
mound, ran past the diggers, and were enveloped by the jungle. Next, a female 
wolf appeared, and Singh knew right away that she would be the greatest 
obstacle to securing the children. Even as the party shouted and threatened her, 
she remained on the mound, baring her teeth and growling at the diggers, and it 
soon became clear to everyone that she was prepared to make a stand—she 
was not going to abandon her home and her family so easily. 
In his diaries, Reverend Singh explains: 
I had a great mind to capture it, because I guessed from its whole bearing on the 
spot that it must have been the mother wolf, whose nature was so ferocious and 
affection so sublime. It struck me with wonder. I was simply amazed to think that 
an animal had such a noble feeling surpassing even that of mankind—the 
highest form of creation—to bestow all the love and affection of a fond and ideal 
mother on these peculiar beings, which surely had once been brought in...as 
food for the cubs. To permit them to live and be nurtured by them (wolves) in this 
fashion is divine. I failed to realize the import of the circumstances and became 
dumb and inert. In the meantime, the men pierced her through with arrows, and 
she fell dead.... After the mother wolf was killed, it was an easy job....I threw one 
of the sheets on [the] ball of children and cubs and separated one from the 
other....We gave the cubs to the diggers...They went away happy and sold [them] 
in the Hat for a good price [while]...I took charge of the two human children. 
Reverend Singh named the girls Kamala and Amala. Kamala was approximately 
eight years old and Amala was eighteen months. After their capture, the girls 
went to live with the Reverend and his wife at their orphanage. But their time 
there was short. Amala lived less than a year; Kamala only nine. During her time 
with the Singhs, Kamala was studied and educated and civilized, though it 
seldom appeared that much of it stuck. She learned a few words, raced around 
on all-fours, preferred the company of dogs to humans, and frightened the other 
orphans by prowling at night, sniffing and growling near their beds in the 
moonlight. She was unappreciated, though the center of attention, and unhappy, 
though finally once again among her own kind. 
It is without question that when we study feral children we inevitably learn more 
about ourselves than our subject. There are more than fifty cases on record of 
feral children—human children raised in the wild by everything from bears and 
leopards to monkeys and birds. Our treatment of the adoptive animal parents is 
notorious—most find the fate of Amala and Kamala’s mother and siblings. And 
the suffering and indignities which we inflict on the human children in the name of 
socializing and civilizing is equally embarrassing. The stories run from simple 
beatings and whippings (all in the name of “reinforcement training”), to the 
extreme cases such as the gazelle-boy, a human male raised by a family of 
gazelles, who, upon being captured, proved to possess the unnerving ability to 
leap great distances—jumping, nearly flying, through the air in the manner of his 
adoptive parents. His human benefactors, unable to persuade him to refrain from 
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such activity and anxious to see him assimilated into human culture, considered 
their options and chose to cut the tendons in his legs thereby inducing less 
gazelle-like behavior.[2]
Each story is different, intriguing in its own right. And each represents a crisis, 
not only for the way in which the children in these cases seem inevitable to be 
mishandled and brutalized as they are introduced to civilization, but because 
their very existence is a threat to our understanding of what it is to be human. 
The existence of feral children calls into question the firm boundary between 
human and animal, forcing us to reevaluate our understanding of ourselves and 
our world. A feral child is the human that is nearly an animal—the familiar that 
has nearly become the Other. 
2. The Non-Physical Differences
Without giving the matter much thought, it seems clear what we mean by 
“humans” and “animals.” Traditionally, the philosophical problem has been 
defining “person”—the moral individual. “Human” is usually considered to be 
easily defined, a matter of genetics or biology—at least a matter of science. 
“Person” is problematic because it both eludes a popularly accepted definition 
and because although there are things that are clearly people (e.g., you, the 
reader) and things that clearly are not (e.g., a hydrogen molecule), there are 
concrete examples of things about which our intuitions supposedly become 
murky (e.g., a fetus, a comatose patient, perhaps a dolphin).  
There are a variety of classical and ancient descriptions of humans that prove 
interesting. We know that Plato considered Man the two-legged naked animal. 
Anaxagoras was entranced by human posture as well, and suggested that 
because we can stand upright on two legs we can better see our world and, more 
importantly, we can have free use of our hands, thus making us superior. 
Aristotle puts an interesting twist on Anaxagoras [see, e.g., De Partibus 
Animalium, 687a] and suggests that it is our mental superiority that allows us to 
use our hands in creative ways, not vice versa. But it is Aristotle’s notion of Man 
as political and rational that has survived and remained most popular. The 
problem, though, is defining “rationality.” If it is to be equated with intelligence, 
awareness, or even problem-solving ability then it does little to separate human 
from animal. Consider, for example and for a closer analysis, Charles Winick’s
definition from The Dictionary of Anthropology: 
Man.a hominid, namely Homo sapien, who [makes] tools....The word man is 
popularly used in a much more narrow manner than taxonomy would indicate, 
and its emotional connotations make it difficult to use in an objective manner. 
The major characteristics that distinguish man from monkeys, apes, and lemurs 
are the following: the nose’s prominent bridge and well-developed tip, a median 
furrow in the upper lip, possession of the chin,...large brain (2 1/2-3 times the 
size of the gorillas)...outrolling of the lips and visibility of the mucous membrane
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as a continuos red line, long life span,...symbolic expression, educability, and 
advanced culture.[3] 
The fact that “Man” is used interchangeably with “human” is intriguing. As 
feminist writers properly point out, this is not simply a quirk of language but rather 
a linguistic manifestation of social conditions.It speaks to the marginalization of 
women—as if humanity can be described by excluding women and making 
reference only to men. Indeed, some have even suggested that since the word 
“human” contains the word man “it must be replaced (or re-spelled) if women are 
to have any hope of changing their social condition.”[4]
The point of this, though, is not just to suggest how language and reality are 
interrelated but to illustrate that the “emotional connotations” of such words as 
“human” run deep. We would like to think that a firm, scientific, objective
definition exists. In fact, even if we admit that such a notion as scientific 
objectivity is a comfortable fiction and that all language actually reflects a socially 
constructed reality, we would like to think that a word such as “human” is, in the 
relative scheme of things, more objective than some others. “Person” and 
“happiness” and “liberty” might seem a little vague, a little culturally dependent, 
but surely we can agree on what constitutes “human” apart from “animal.” After 
all, the words are scientific terms or at least derivatives of one. They are more 
like “manganese sulfate” or “microprocessor” than “person” or “happiness."  
Or so it would seem. Winick’s definition struggles to provide an “objective” set of 
characteristics to distinguish humans from other creatures, but the set proves 
suspect. First, it is important to note that Winick defines “human” by 
distinguishing humans from other animals near the top of the assumed 
evolutionary ladder. Conjure up in your mind, he seems to be saying, that group 
of primate-monkey-ape-human-like animals. Now, how can you tell the humans 
from the rest? 
Already, it should be clear there is a problem. Before we even get to the set of 
characteristics peculiarly human we see that this definition rests on a multitude of 
unarticulated assumptions. First, is it so obvious what characteristics constitute 
apes and monkeys and higher primates? These classifications must be clear 
before we can use them to define “human.” Second, we should be aware that this 
type of definition is one that will allow us to pick out the real human from a group 
of creatures that are “human-like,” but it does little to help us determine whether 
a creature is in fact “human-like” or “animal-like.” Furthermore, the argument 
goes that if we compare the nose, lip, chin, brain size, etc. of the creature, we 
should be close to determining whether it is human or not, but at the most what 
we are determining is whether it is not very gorilla-like (or at least not very much 
like the “ideal” gorilla-type). Is “human” properly defined as “anything-that-is­
gorilla-like but has a larger brain, a more prominent nose, a longer life span, 
etc.”? Something seems lacking. 
But perhaps these specific characteristics, if scrutinized, do more work than one 
might suppose. Perhaps they can define “human” and not simply separate 
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humans from apes. Winick’s definition, which is characteristic in the literature, 
lists two different types of distinguishing features. The first type is purely physical, 
and includes such notions as brain size, nose shape, and lip formation. The 
second type is non-physical and includes educability, tool making know-how, 
symbolic expression, and cultural achievements.  
Unfortunately, the non-physical characteristics are not very helpful, at least not 
without further explication. Educability is a large notion—large enough, surely, to 
include talking parrots, chimps who learn sign language, and even stupid-pet­
trick performing dogs. Indeed, the gazelles who raised the gazelle-boy in the wild 
seemed to have learned to interpret the boy’s facial expressions to the same 
degree that the boy had learned the gazelles’ ear-twitching language. Tool 
making, once thought to be the proud domain of “humans,” is also an activity in 
which we now know other animals (that is, clearly non-human animals) indulge. 
Elephants have been known to use trees to scratch an itch. Some monkeys use 
stones to smash open nuts and seeds.[5] And other monkeys carefully choose 
tree limbs and methodically strip them of leaves and protruding stubs in order to 
fashion “dip sticks” to retrieve ants and other insects from holes in the ground 
and in stumps. This is not simply tool-use, but tool-making.  
Also relevant to this question of tools is the fact that most creatures we now 
consider “human” are losing or have lost tool making abilities they might have 
had. Technology, often considered to be a tool, has moved beyond the tool 
stage. It has become such that most civilized humans would have a hard time 
surviving for very long without their technological tools—thus causing us to 
question whether they serve us or, due to our dependence, we serve them. We 
have learned to push the right buttons on telephones and microwaves, but few of 
us could fashion tools that would help us survive if we were suddenly left without 
technology.[6]
The question of symbolic expression is similarly unhelpful in that although this is 
not a skill humans seem to be losing, it is clearly the case that a variety of 
animals use and understand symbols. From the monkey/sign-language example 
[7]to the case of the research pigeons who used such concepts as “tree,” [8]
non-human animals seem capable of a wide variety of abstractions. In fact, if 
what is truly meant by “symbolic expression” is “language,” then it cannot be 
denied that animal languages abound. Whether in the sub-sonic level of 
elephants and whales, in the intricate language of birds,[9] or in the patterns of a 
dancing bee, information is constantly being transmitted around us. Sounds and 
movements represent objects and states of affairs, and to fail to call this 
“language” would be blind hubris.
Finally, there is the question of culture—once again, a difficult concept to pin 
down. Some wolves, we know, perform complex hunting ceremonies before they 
set out to the task. Ranking in chimp society is based neither on size nor strength 
but on the social status of one’s parents. And dolphins, with their intricate social 
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structures, are believed by many to possess a culture and a set of traditions 
particular to each school. Discussing the possibility of animals as socio-cultural 
beings, Dutch philosopher Barbara Noske indicates that there is reason to 
believe that “culturally transmitted practices and ideas are part of a collective 
memory...[and] that dolphin traditions too are cultural in that they belong to the 
school as a whole, an entity which is greater than the sum of its individual 
parts.”[10]
As a result, it would seem that the traditional non-physical characteristics 
particular to humans do little to constitute a definition capable of distinguishing
many species from each other. But what of the physical differences which 
supposedly define humanity?  
3. The Physical Differences
Often, human bodies are distinguished from animal bodies in a linguistically ad 
hoc manner. In English, humans have “hair” but animals have “fur.” In Spanish,
humans walk on “piernas” (legs) but animals walk on “patas.” French animals 
smell with a “museaux,” but French humans use a “nez.” [11] Surely, these body 
parts have more commonalities than differences, but the words serve to separate 
artificially.[12]
Unfortunately, the words themselves do little to help us define “human.” In 
Spanish, for instance, a leg might be a “pierna” if it is human and a “pata” if it is 
animal, but defining a human as having “piernas” rather than “patas” 
accomplishes nothing. These parts are named after one knows the type of 
creature with which one is dealing. Standing alone, the Spanish sentence “Con 
qué corre el?” (“What does he use to run?”) cannot be answered unless one 
knows whether or not the subject is human. This testifies to the fact that the real 
difference is contrived. Legs are legs, but having a different word for a human leg 
separates humans (and serves to make us “special”). The word can only be 
used, then, after one has distinguished the human from the non-human.  
The power of language to construct difference rather than mirror difference 
makes the task of determining particularly human physical traits difficult, but not 
necessarily impossible. Winick, recall, offered descriptions of a human nose, lip, 
chin, and brain based on shape, color, weight, etc. Are such differences the stuff 
of which a proper definition can be had? 
The problem, once again, is the ad hoc nature of the list of qualities; and this 
problem, I maintain, is inevitable in any definition based on a list of 
characteristics.[13] The difficulty is in arguing for why this particular set of 
characteristics is key to being human. Curved lips and protruding chins are seen 
as important qualities, but why these qualities? The true problem becomes clear 
if we ask a distasteful yet enlightening question: why, someone might say, would 
we not include white skin as a particularly human trait? That is, humans, by 
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definition, would have chins, furrowed lips, and fair skin, etc. The only possible 
response to such a question is that there are humans who aren’t white—indeed, 
humans come in many colors—and therefore it would be wrong to include skin 
color as a determining factor. But now the problem should be evident, for how do 
we know that humans are not all white unless we already knew who counts as a 
human? And this is cheating. If we are trying to define “human” we cannot say 
beforehand who is human and who is not, and therefore know what qualities 
seem to be common only to humans. It is as if we first divide up the world into 
humans and non-humans, and then look to see what qualities the humans 
possess as a group that are not common to the creatures in the other group. Skin 
color won’t work because humans have variously colored skin. Big brains might 
work, though, because all humans seem to have brains (on the average) larger 
than the creatures in the non-human group. Using this method we could then 
construct a list of qualities shared by humans and humans alone, but the 
question would remain: how did we know how to divide up the world initially? On 
what criteria did we base this initial categorization? It would seem that we already 
had to know who we wanted to count and who we didn’t want to count before we 
started. Any definition achieved after this categorization is thus hopelessly ad 
hoc. 
And there are other problems as well. Winick’s insistence on “red” lips, for 
instance, seems curious. Surely this is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for being human and it is questionable, really, whether the majority of 
“humans” actually have red lips. The question of a “well-developed tip” to the 
nose is equally suspect. Certainly, these are cultural ideals for (though perhaps 
not even common among) Europeans, [14] but this does not describe, for 
instance, the typical African face. 
Realizing the import of all of this, I will not take any more time to continue to 
develop the thesis of a cultural and racial bias in Winick’s definition, but it is 
important to see the possibility of such bias and the ease with which such a 
“scientific” definition both reflects and more firmly establishes racial power 
structures in society. African humans, and “recent” African descendants,[15] are, 
by this definition, a little less human, a little closer to being animal. If we accept 
such a definition, we also tend to accept more easily such things as Charles 
Murray’s recent claim that African Americans are less intelligent than whites, [16]
and to accept the behavior of one of the LAPD officers who was involved in the 
Rodney King beating and who referred to a domestic violence call involving an 
African American family as a case of “gorillas in the mist.” This defining-business 
has serious implications for us all.  
And what if Winick’s definition were to be accepted? What if we ignored its ad 
hoc nature and the clear racial bias in this list of physical qualities needed to be 
truly human? Is this what we mean by truly human? Is being human to be 
understood as having a chin? I do not mean to diminish the role of physical 
structure in being human—indeed, the experience of body is something that must 
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concern us throughout this project—but something seems lacking in such a 
definition: to be human is to be chinned.  
Other approaches are similarly flawed. Philip Bock stresses the tool-making 
abilities of humans, but also offers a more historical-anthropological definition of 
human as “the favorite child of evolution.” [17] Such genus-species definitions 
are interesting and have continuously grown in popularity since Charles Darwin 
first suggested something similar in 1871. [18] According to this definition, apes
and humans parted ways 20 to 40 million years ago and have been evolving 
separately ever since. And you can tell a human by tracing its “blood-line.”  
Most scientists, it turns out, enjoy such a definition, and with increasing 
technology many feel that they can pinpoint the date at which humans first 
appeared with even greater accuracy. Physical anthropologist Chris Stringer 
uses advanced DNA analysis to supplement the standard tools of carbon dating 
and just plain digging in the dirt in order to suggest that early modern man 
appeared 30,000 years ago, probably in Africa.[19] A colleague of Stringer’s 
further proposes that each branch of the genus Homo can claim a common 
mother—a single female who lived in Africa 200,000 years ago. All of this from 
DNA evidence.  
The secular version of Eve is enticing. She pulls us all together—truly making us 
brothers and sisters. And she fits nicely into the scientific world-view as well, for 
even though it is hard to imagine that one real woman existed to whom we are all 
related, evolution seemingly demands that this must be the case. At a certain 
point some non-human animal fetus proved to be a random mutation, and Eve 
was born—the mother of all humanity. 
One of the problems with such a story is that it is surely a crude telling of history. 
Evolution is a process, not an event, and modern humans probably “emerged” 
slowly—mutation by mutation. This is problematic because we are then left with a 
long period of time in which it is “clear” that the initial creatures are not human, it 
is “clear” that the end creatures are human, and it is completely unclear at what 
point humans actually appear and the non-human becomes the human.[20]
Perhaps someone might say, though, that a certain “branch” of the tree is the 
human branch, and since all of the creatures except for “us” have died off from 
that branch, is this not enough to constitute a definition of humanity?  
Separating humans from other animals by means of branching evolution or DNA 
does not solve the problem of securing a definition. First, we must wonder how to 
cut the branch—i.e., how far back do we go to determine the start of “humans”? 
Pruning the non-human from the human once again seems an inherently 
arbitrary task and assumes that we already know what a human is. Second, 
there is the further assumption that these limbs (or DNA patterns) are easily 
distinguished—that we can draw an accurate picture of our family tree with each 
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branch neatly placed, each DNA sequence understood and labeled. The truth is 
that scientists themselves continue to fight over the appropriate design of the tree 
and some are even questioning the validity of evolution’s claim to be the one 
explanation as to how the living world operates.[21] Indeed, assuming unerring 
knowledge of the “tree of evolution” as a given fundamentally begs several 
questions raised by the arguments presented here. Finally, the 
anthropological/genetic definition of “human” is lacking because it fails to reflect 
what we typically mean when we say “human.” Defining “human” by means of 
distant hairy relatives or genetic tests capable of being run only by a few experts 
in our society is just as unfulfilling as defining “human” as a creature with a chin. 
There is nothing inherently wrong with such a definition, but there is a strong 
sense that it fails to convey the essence of what (we think) we mean by “human.”  
The power of the anthropological approach, though, is the way in which it pulls us 
together, relating us to each other and attempting to define us as a group. But 
the secular Eve—that 200,000 year old African woman—can, at most, relate our 
bodies. The religious Eve, [22] on the other hand, relates us in immaterial ways, 
embodying the “spirit” of our humanity. Perhaps what is needed is a mixture of 
these approaches. Can we give an account of a “fuller” humanity? Can we offer a 
history of the body and a history of the spirit capable of defining who we humans 
are? 
Many communitarian theorists would maintain that they have accomplished just 
this. Authors such as MacIntyre, Sandel, Hauerwas, and Carr speak of 
narratives, stories, and traditions constituting our identity—constituting, even, our 
Selves. Although these arguments are often at the level of individual 
communities and cultures, could they not be expanded to account for the 
constitution of all human communities and of all humans? Could telling a story 
about who “we” humans are—in body and spirit—actually serve to constitute this 
“we”? 
An interesting problem with this solution is that if we look at our stories and our 
histories and even at our common goods, we discover that they do not constitute 
a community of humans, but rather a community of living beings of many 
different types. I call this a Deep Community, and I have argued for it in some 
detail elsewhere.[23] The point is that the stories we tell do not separate humans 
from animals, but rather tie the living world together as one. Our stories are all 
interconnected, as are our goods. If one attempts to unweave these strands, they 
cannot stand alone. [24] I cannot tell the story of who I am without telling the 
story of the animals [25] around me: I am constituted, in part, by them. And the 
same is true at the level of the story of humanity. 
But perhaps being human is best understood as being a particular character in
the intertwining stories of the living world. Human characters have a certain 
physical presence and they play certain roles. The relationships humans have to 
other characters constitute what it means to be human, and the act of defining 
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“human” thus becomes not an act of separating and distinguishing, but an act of 
recognizing the appropriate player in the context of the scene.  
Such a definition is not very scientific. It is loose and open and admits the 
possibility of a constantly changing identity. And it is, I think, about the best we
can hope for. The fact that what it means to be human changes with time and 
even with context places the traditional hierarchy and the traditional boundary 
between human and animal at risk. The strict dichotomies of human/animal, 
human/non-human, and us/them do not make sense in such a story. Yet we 
continue to think, speak, and act as if they do. And this is curious. What accounts 
for this chasm between the way in which we experience the world and the way in 
which we act in the world, between the experienced truth of who we are and the 
constructed fiction of who we think ourselves to be, between, most basically, 
phenomenology and praxis? This question must remain the focus for us now as 
we move to investigate what happens when the hierarchies collapse and the 
boundaries fail—what happens when we are faced with a crisis in our experience 
such that the familiar becomes the Other.  
4. Feral Children: The Human that is Nearly Animal
Feral children such as the wolf girls Kamala and Amala have formed part of our 
story for a long time. There are both mythical and factual cases, though the latter 
are becoming increasingly rare as “civilization” spreads across the land. The fact 
is, it is harder today for a child to remain hidden in the wilderness because there 
is, daily, less wilderness.  
We begin by noting that although the feral children of myth play an important role 
in determining who we are, the factual cases will be our focus. From Romulus 
and Remus, to Tarzan, Mowgli, and the various heroes populating the dimestore 
novels of the genre which flourished in America for the first half of this century, 
fiction has used the feral child to help us better understand ourselves and our 
society. The non-fictional cases, I maintain, serve much the same function in a 
different way. Still, it is common and not unwise to begin with some skepticism. 
Even our moments of skeptical inquiry say much about us.  
In one tale of skepticism that is perhaps as fictional as the feral child it involves, 
we are told that Aristotle could admit the possibility of animals rearing humans, 
but insisted that each individual case needed his personal investigation. One 
medieval story suggests that Alexander the Great met and fell in love with a 
snake girl—a human female who was said to have been “hatched” and cared for 
by snakes after being placed in a broken eggshell and abandoned by humans. 
Alexander lusted after the snake girl and wanted her as his mistress, but his 
teacher, Aristotle, advised caution. Placing a ring of snake venom around her, 
Aristotle sought to test the girl’s origins. In the end, we are told, the fumes of the 
venom strangled her and the snake girl died—a supposedly proud Aristotle 
nearby, thinking that he had proven the girl could not have lived in the company 
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snakes. [26] Again, the fate of the feral child—real or mythical—is typically 
sealed upon his or her introduction into human society. 
Our peculiar treatment of feral children is partially a direct result of our confusion 
over their, and more fundamentally our, nature. Surely there is a desire to see 
these children act in a more familiar manner—hence, the cutting of the gazelle­
boy’s tendons, the common desire to teach captured feral children to eat with 
utensils, the longing to coaxe them to speak, etc. In such cases there is an 
attempt to mold the habits, personality, and even the body of the child into 
something more recognizably human. 
Indeed, the body plays an important role in our understanding here. Reverend 
Singh was especially bothered by the “corns on the knees and on the palm of the 
hand near the wrist which [Kamala and Amala] had developed from walking on 
all fours.” [27] After scrubbing and treating the corns with boric acid, Reverend 
Singh cut the girls’ hair and washed their bodies several times, struggling to 
remove layers and layers of “dirt.” A transformation of the body had begun, but 
Singh soon discovered that it was in appearance only. The bodies of the girls 
were inherently “different.” In the following passage one should note the 
references to animals and to animal bodies as the ideal non-human body:  
They looked [like] human children again...[But for the 
jawbones]. The jaws...had undergone some sort of change 
in the chewing of bones....When they moved their jaws in
chewing, the upper and lower jawbones appeared to part 
and close visibly, unlike human jaws....They could sit on the 
ground squatting down,...but could not stand up at all....Their 
eyes...had a peculiar blue glare, like that of a cat or dog, in 
the dark. At night...you saw only two blue lights sending forth
rays in the dark. They could see better by night than by 
day....They could detect the existence of...any object in the 
darkest place when and where human sight fails 
completely....They had a powerful instinct and could smell 
meat or anything from a great distance like animals....Their 
hands and arms were long, almost reaching to the 
knees....The nails of the hand and foot were worn on the 
inside to a concave shape....They used to eat or drink like 
dogs...[and] could not walk like humans. They went on all 
fours [and] they used to sleep like pigs or dog pups, 
overlapping one another.[28]
Indeed, the girls preferred to keep their bodies close in this manner, sometimes 
even when not sleeping. When Amala died, Kamala touched her face and clung 
to her body in the coffin. She cried two tears, and for the next six days sat in a 
corner, moving only to smell all of the places Amala had frequented. Left alone, 
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though, Kamala soon began a strict regime designed by the Singhs to “help [her] 
use her body in human ways.”[29]
The ease with which Reverend Singh separates animals traits from human traits 
in the girls should, at this point in our inquiry, stand out as clearly suspect. It is 
also important to note the degree to which the body is a social construct and the 
way in which this fact is evidenced by Singh’s commentary. What accounts for 
the girls’ bodies seeming so inhuman if, in fact, they were genetically human, the 
offspring of human parents? Singh, and most commentators, suggest a series of 
mutations—adaptations to the environment which erode the humanity of the 
body. In other words, what began as human has become animal. Chewing on 
bones, for instance, has warped the jaw, and walking on all fours has formed 
corns and calluses on the knees and wrists. Human wrists are smooth, and the 
assumption is that Kamala and Amala began with smooth wrists, and then 
adapted to walking like animals and were changed. Restoring their humanity 
involved re-shaping the body.  
The arms present a different problem. If, in fact, they were elongated, hanging to 
their knees, it is hard to explain how such a change—from “human” arms to more 
“simian” arms—took place. Would arms grow longer if we used them to walk? 
And what of the girls’ eyes? Is a cat-like glare possible for human eyes in which 
the retina is typically thought to be incapable of reflecting light to any noticeable 
degree? [30] Mutations such as these cannot be accounted for by an appeal to 
simple adaptation without admitting that the body is neither naturally human nor 
animal but rather becomes whatever is most appropriate for the context. In a 
sense, this is what Darwinism is all about. The body, for Darwin, is an 
environmental construct, never stable, never finished. Evolution, though, is a 
slow process and will not admit the possibility of major change so quickly. 
Furthermore, evolutionary change is from generation to generation, not within 
one organism over a few years. An environmental construct is context relative, 
but this answer will not explain Reverend Singh’s observations and worries.  
Perhaps a solution can be seen in Singh’s observation that the girls had a 
“powerful instinct” that led them to smell over great distances “like animals.” An 
instinct is curious because it strikes at the heart of Cartesian dualism—the way in 
which we exist as both body and mind. An instinct is psychological in nature; it
dictates behavior. Yet it is precariously incarnate in that it is “built in” to a body— 
to a species-specific body. How could Kamala and Amala have a non-human 
instinct? 
Suggesting, in this manner, that the body is a social construct is nothing new.
Many feminist authors have written convincingly on the subject, and the sensory 
evidence surrounds us. Bodies are objectified and fought, dissected into pieces 
and admired, technologically modified and reinvented. The breast is surely a 
social creation. Fat is a social creation. Hair is a social creation. And this is more 
than a critique of Wonderbras, Jenny Craig, and Rogaine. It is an admission that 
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what the body is (and what the body should be) is communally defined. [31]
Being human is being a certain size and shape and smell, etc. It is not a matter 
of the body adapting to its surroundings but rather of the body being constructed 
to fit the society. And the same is true of animal bodies, which are usually, 
though not always, defined by their non-human characteristics.[32]
Instinct, arms, and eyes are certainly no exception; and the wolf girls’ failure to 
meet the “human standard” represents a crisis for us. Science is little help. By 
ancestral-definitions, the girls are human. By characteristic-definitions, they are 
animal. Their bodies are unfamiliar, yet like our own. Noske has suggested that 
feral children “not only have met the Other, the have almost become the Other.” 
[33] Almost. Especially if we understand the animal Other to be a construct in the 
same sense as the human Self. But there is a crisis nonetheless. In fact, the 
great Swedish taxonomist Linnaeus (Carl von Linné)—of whom the Swedes still 
say “God created, and Linnaeus classified”—was so disturbed by feral children 
that he separated them on the pre-Darwinian biological tree as Homo ferus. 
We are left to wonder if this is a legitimate distinction. Anthropological lineage 
was not enough to define humanity, for feral children surely are born from human 
parents. Perhaps Reverend Singh’s insistence on the animal bodies Kamala and 
Amala had acquired was an attempt to understand their Otherness, and to 
reaffirm his own humanity. Perhaps Linnaeus’ classification fulfills a similar need. 
What is clear is that the comfortable fiction of a human/animal dichotomy and the 
notion of a strict definition for “human” and “animal” are threatened by feral 
children. 
At this point, though, we have only analyzed the body of the feral child and its 
implications for our notions of human and animal. Not wishing to give in to any 
dualism, we can still acknowledge that the crisis is not merely one of body. The 
behavior, psychology, and mental life of feral children also seem to call into 
question our concept of “human.” 
It is easy enough to suggest that what keeps feral children from being (fully) 
human is their lack of human education and culture. They neither use human 
language to communicate nor do they understand how humans interact with 
each other: years of living outside civilization has stripped them of their humanity. 
Perhaps, though, humanity is something that is not taken from feral children, but 
rather something that is never bestowed upon them. There are a variety of ways 
to argue such a point. One might say that feral children do not cast themselves 
as humans in their stories and thus never achieve human status. This is an 
interesting approach, but allow me to suggest another more phenomenological 
explanation beginning with the question: what if a child needs to be treated and 
attended to as human in order to be human?  
In conclusion, I will only offer a brief sketch of this proposal here. What I have in 
mind is the notion that the burgeoning consciousness of the infant will not 
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necessarily “develop” into human intentionality on its own, but rather requires the 
presence of a Significant Other who is human. Typically, the human Significant 
Other (very often the mother) attends to the infant as if he or she were human. 
This “gracious act of attention” [34] is thus responsible for “creating” a human­
person—a new member of the community. The infant, as a consequence, 
develops senses of Self and Other simultaneously. It is not the case that an 
infant first has a sense of Self and then wonders if there really are other minds 
out there. He is not aware of his own Ego and then begins to investigate the 
world, seeing which objects act and look similar to the way he acts and looks, 
and thus which objects must be Others. Instead, the senses of Ego and Other 
arise as themes at the same time. 
Now all of this is getting us involved in matters that are somewhat off-topic; but 
they are important, for it would seem that without the gracious act of attention 
coming from a human, the infant does not become human. Along the same line, 
James Hart suggests that: “If the first Other is not a human person, the Other to 
the Other which I (i.e., the infant) can be is not a human person.” [35] This would 
accomplish a great deal toward explaining the case of the feral child. Without a 
human Other to attend to the child as human, the child does not become 
human—which is not to say that feral children have no sense of Self or Other, but 
rather that such senses do not include “humanity.” Amala and Kamala clearly did 
not have the intentional life of human beings. It is not just that their social skills, 
psychologies, and attitudes were non-human. Something deeper in the psychic 
life of the girls was different. The structures of their experience were not “human 
structures”—such structures could not arise and take shape in their burgeoning 
streams of consciousness without the presence of the human Other to cause 
them to take shape. How powerful, this gracious act of attention.  
Indeed, if we imagine attending to “non-human” individuals such as dogs as if 
they were human, would it not be possible to “create” humanity? Anecdotal 
evidence abounds: the story of the dog “who thinks he is a member of the 
family—thinks he is human” is common. Perhaps there is at least some partial 
truth in such a claim, as a dog who is treated and attended to as human might be 
said to develop something of a “human” Self. Surely, there are physical 
limitations to and preconditions for such development, but the line between 
human and animal cannot be maintained with rigidity in the light of such 
evidence.  
What does all this mean for our investigation into the divide between human and 
animal? Humans, we know, are not defined genetically or anthropologically. The 
same is true of animals. Neither, though, are humans simply created through 
education and inculturation or through their participation in narratives and 
traditions; in more hierarchical terms they do not lift themselves up by their own 
bootstraps from a group of animals. Humanity is in some respect the result of 
specific treatment within one’s community. To have human experiences, one 
must be attended to as a human. To develop human intentionality one must be 
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15 
treated as if he or she already possessed such intentional structures. Being 
human is being treated by humans as human. And this is the lesson of feral
children who live in the murky region between Self and Other, human and 
animal—a region we are slow to discover is not one marked by strict boundaries.  
[1] The account of Singh and the wolf-children which follows is drawn 
from Douglas Candlands’ Feral Children and Clever Animals (NY: Oxford
University Press, 1993), 55-68. 
[2] Barbara Noske. Humans and Other Animals. (London: Pluto Press,
1989), 184. 
[3] Charles Winick, Dictionary of Anthropology (NY: Philosophical 
Library, 1956), 339. 
[4] The examples here are numerous, though one might begin with Dorothy 
Sayers, “The Human Not-Quite-Human” in Masculine/Feminine.  Roszak and 
Roszak, eds. (NY: Harper and Row, 1969); Janice Moulton, “The Myth of the 
Neutral ‘Man’” in Sexist Language, Mary Vetterling-Braggin, ed. (NY: Littlefield, 
Adamas and Co., 1981); Joyce Penfield, ed. Women and Language in Transition
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1987); and Jeanette Silveira, “Generic Masculine Words 
and Thinking” in Voices and Words of Women and Men, Cheris Kramarae, ed. 
(NY: Pergamon Press, 1980). 
[5] Cf. Noske, 153. 
[6] This is a large subject. It touches on the question of the nature of a tool and the nature
of technology—questions too grand to concern us at the moment. It is interesting to note, though, 
what modern cities and modern technology have done to our “natural” human abilities. It is clear 
that some knowledge has been lost at a rate at least as great as other knowledge has been
gained. Generations of humans—removed from the land, reduced to working for wage labor in a
mechanized society—no longer have any real skills of survival such as tool making. Without
processed food and “mechanized fire,” most of us would go hungry. Rare is the individual among
us, even, who could grow grain, mill it to flour, and bake a loaf of bread. The acts of eating and
providing shelter, etc. are accomplished quite well by non-humans who are not dependent on
external apparatus—tools that have come to rule us. But we stray from our subject... 
[7] See, for instance, David Premack, “Language in Chimpanzee.” Science, v.172, 1971, 
pp. 808-822. Premack argues that chimps can think in abstract symbols. Especially intriguing is 
one chimp named Sarah who learned that a plastic blue triangle represented an apple. When
asked to describe the triangle, she indicated “red” and “round.” 
[8] Noske relates the story of how pigeons did the job of picking out pictures with trees as 
the pictured trees become more and more abstract—better, even, that the most sophisticated
computers. (p. 144). 
[9] who seem capable of learning other species of birds’ languages and interpreting the 
content—a warning, a caution, a signal of found food—even if they can only speak/sing their own. 
[10] Noske, 155. 
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[11] Actually, the French “nose” is an interesting case. All animals are said to have a
“museau” except for the dog, who, like a human has a “nez.” The French are well known for 
treating dogs as if they had a superior status, and this is reflected in the language. Some people 
say that the French treat dogs better than they treat Americans, though this author would never
think to perpetuate such a stereotype. 
[12] Related examples abound (e.g., German humans “essen” food but German animals
“fressen” food), perhaps culminating in the ultimate animal-meat/human-muscle duality which
clearly demonstrates the power of language to determine ontology and teleology and not just to
label objectively. 
[13] Mary Ann Warren’s (in)famous definition of “person” in her “On the Moral and Legal
Status of Abortion” ( The Monist v. 57, n. 4, Oct. 1973) suffers from this same problem. It is 
endemic to the genre of list-definitions. Note the ease with which the following argument and line
of criticism serves to dismantle a position such as Warren’s as well as Winick’s. 
[14] The phrase “well-developed” should be a warning signal here. 
15] I say “recent” for a reason which will become clear below in my discussion of a 
search for the mother of humanity. 
[16] See Charles Murray’ and Richard Herrnstein. The Bell Curve (NY: Free Press,
1994). 
[17] See Philip K. Bock. Modern Cultural Anthropology. (NY: Alfred A. Knopf,1969), 3. 
The diagram which follows is based on Bock’s own: 
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[18] See Charles Darwin. The Descent of Man. (NY:Modern Library, 1949), a work first 
published in 1871. 
[19] “The World of National Geographic: Mysteries of Mankind” airdate 5/21/95. 
[20] This problem suggests that “human” as an anthropological term is a vague predicate.
There is a great deal of literature on vague predicates—both as a topic for analytic philosophy (in
that vague predicates tend to create paradoxes such as the Sorites paradox) and in the abortion
debate concerning the status of the fetus as “person.” For an introduction to the latter one might 
see Jane English’s “Abortion and the Concept of a Person.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy v. 5,
n. 2. Oct. 1975. I will not pursue the argument that “human” is a type of vague predicate here,
though most of what I have been saying in another form would count as evidence for such a 
formalized argument. 
[21] Darwinism does not face criticism from creationists only. See, for instance, A. R. 
Manser “The Concept of Evolution” Philosophy 40:18-34, 1965; Norman Mabeth Darwin Retried
(Boston: Gambit, Inc., 1971), and I. Bethell “Darwin’s Mistake.” Harper’s Magazine 252:70-75, 
1976, who argue that “survival of the fittest” is a tautology since the only way to identify “the 
fittest” is to see who survived. Karl Popper (The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Paul A. Schlipp, ed. 
(La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1974)) is also famous for, among other things, his insistence that 
Darwin’s evolution is untestable and nonfalsifiable. And scientists such as Julian Huxley and Willi
Hennig (see Hennig’s Phylogenetic Systematics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966)) have 
even suggested an alternative scientific twist to Darwin by introducing the notion of a “clade” as a 
branch of the evolutionary tree. As Peter Bowler (Evolution: The History of an Idea (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1989)) points out “‘transformed cladists claim that the ancestor-
descendent link so crucial to evolution cannot be derived from their way of expressing
relationships. Outspoken critics of Darwinism, they have extended the charge that the attempt to
reconstruct the past history of life is unscientific and have taken up enthusiastically some of the 
established arguments against natural selection.” (p. 345). Such arguments are indeed more
numerous than one might at first imagine. 
[22] and other such figures in the world’s religions. 
[23] Cf. my “The Boundaries of the Phenomenological Community: Non-Human Life and
the Extent of our Moral Enmeshment,” in Becoming Persons. Robert N. Fisher, ed. (Oxford, 
England: Applied Theology Press, 1995), 777-797; and “Deep Community: Phenomenology’s 
Disclosure of the Common Good,” in Between the Species 10, number 3-4 (Summer/Fall 1994),
98-105. 
[24] In my “Deep Community” I even suggest that to be human is to be connected to 
animals, and that a human community that is not in the presence of an animal community— 
another theme of science fiction—is not a human community at all.This “feral” community could 
not achieve the status of “human.” Note that such an argument need not rely on a strict definition
of what constitutes humanity. Our enmeshment, though, is certainly necessary for our being
“human.” 
[25] and other living beings! 
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[26] Philip José Farmer, Mother Was a Lovely Beast (Radnor, PA: Chilton Book
Company, 1874), 232. 
[27] Candland, 59. 
[28] Candland, 61. 
[29] Candland, 66. 
[30] Candland (61) points out that the commentator Zingg is troubled by this apparent
impossibility, and goes to great lengths to document cases of reflective human retinas, even 
reporting the case of an American biologist involved with a shooting at night due to such
reflection. Zingg’s scrambling for evidence—scientific and biological—attests to the point being
made here. 
[31] I cannot resist two short examples. The first comes from the magazine Fitness (June,
1995) in a story urging women to aerobicize and marry rich. “How to marry a rich man?” asks the
subtitle. “Become incredibly buff.” In one story a trainer who met his wife at the gym admits that 
when he first saw her he said to himself: “she [has] very nice hamstrings” (p. 74). One could
argue the case that until recently, hamstrings did not exist in our culture—let alone nice ones. The
second example comes from a CNN report on beauty indicating that in many cultures, including
our own, the beautiful human face—especially female—has little or no chin. The smaller the chin, 
the greater the beauty (and the more properly human?). This is especially intriguing given the 
importance of the chin in defining humanity for so many scientists/anthropologists—irony with no
equal! 
[32] Dog and cat diet foods serve as a good example here as do doggy sweaters, but
again the point is deep. The body of the chicken and steer are certainly social constructs: objects-
for-ingestion. Circus and zoo animals are also obvious constructs. Indeed, the power relations 
mentioned below infect the nature of all animal bodies.
[33] Noske, 167. 
[34] The phrase is James Hart’s. Confer his The Person and the Common Life
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992).
[35] Hart , 196. 
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